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Abstract
Humans and AI systems are usually portrayed as separate sys-
tems that we need to align in values and goals. However, there
is a great deal of AI technology found in non-autonomous
systems that are used as cognitive tools by humans. Under
the extended mind thesis, the functional contributions of these
tools become as essential to our cognition as our brains. But
AI can take cognitive extension towards totally new capabil-
ities, posing new philosophical, ethical and technical chal-
lenges. To analyse these challenges better, we define and
place AI extenders in a continuum between fully-externalized
systems, loosely coupled with humans, and fully-internalized
processes, with operations ultimately performed by the brain,
making the tool redundant. We dissect the landscape of cog-
nitive capabilities that can foreseeably be extended by AI and
examine their ethical implications. We suggest that cognitive
extenders using AI be treated as distinct from other cognitive
enhancers by all relevant stakeholders, including developers,
policy makers, and human users.
Introduction
Many societal and ethical issues about AI are seen under
the perspective of autonomous systems that can replace hu-
mans, such as a self-driving car, a robotic delivery system or
a fully-fledged diagnosis system. While this is often a use-
ful perspective, other AI systems are more interactive and
coupled, such as a language translator assistant that relies
on human interaction. These systems are not autonomous
in the traditional sense as they do not perform tasks on their
own. Instead their purpose is to help humans complete tasks.
Some would say that these systems are work-in-progress AI,
because the task has just been semi-automated or assisted.
But many sophisticated AI techniques, including machine
learning techniques, can just as well be applied in interactive
and coupled systems. One very interesting feature of these
interactions is the way the user changes their reasoning pro-
cesses: it is not that part of the process has been replaced;
rather the whole task has been redesigned, and the skills of
the human user often co-evolve with the technology.
Non-autonomous AI systems offer a repertoire of services
and tasks that will become more abstract and general in
the future, and carry the potential to offer humans entirely
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new cognitive abilities: they can be a cognitive tool. This is
aligned with –but goes beyond– what is sometimes called
“cognition as a service” (2015) or the rise of “cognitive as-
sistants” (2018). The key difference is that cognitive tools
are more tightly coupled with our biological cognitive sys-
tem and, at the same time, more ubiquitous, such that view-
ing them as an external service or an application no longer
makes sense, especially when we have to account for how
these technologies are perceived and assimilated by humans,
and how their impact and ethical consequences are assessed.
In contemporary philosophy there are views that can shed
light on this phenomenon. The extended cognition thesis is
a popular emerging view in the fields of philosophy of mind
and cognition that claims that tools in an agent’s environ-
ment (i.e., beyond their biological organism) can serve as
partially constitutive ‘extensions’ of their cognitive states
and processes. The view thereby rejects the longstanding
tradition of understanding the mind as nothing more than
the operations of the brain. Perhaps the most influential ar-
gument for the extended cognition thesis comes from Clark
and Chalmers (1998), but in the last two decades many other
arguments have been proffered, and the view has become a
widely debated topic. In general the thesis maintains that the
tools we use to help us complete cognitive tasks can become
seamlessly integrated into our biological capacities, being
on a par with our brains in so far as both play an indispens-
able functional role in bringing about our cognitive abilities.
A standard example is the indispensable role that a pen and
paper play for a mathematician in solving complex equa-
tions. These ‘cognitive tools’ are more than just tools, they
are incorporated as part of the mind (it likewise would not
make sense to call the brain a ‘tool’ for the mind).
In this paper we explore what new abilities could be ex-
tended in the future using AI, and what their ethical and so-
cietal implications might be. Within the philosophical lit-
erature on extended cognition, these possibilities remain
entirely unexplored. Meanwhile the development of non-
autonomous AI systems remains second-class to the ‘gen-
uine’ AI that is explicitly devoted to the development of au-
tonomous agency. Hence in this paper, we aim to tie these
two fields together, to the mutual benefit of both disciplines.
These different objectives will likely translate to differ-
ent conceptions of AI, and its role for the future. While
early computers were aimed at automating tedious number-
crunching tasks, a different vision emerged of the computer
as a real-time interactive system that could support and ex-
pand human capacities (Licklider 1960; Engelbart 1962).
Now a similar dilemma emerges between AI systems that
are autonomous and can replace humans in certain tasks and
those that are designed to augment human intelligence in
different ways (Rouse and Spohrer 2018). Instead of AI sys-
tems functioning as autonomous agents, one can conceive
the creation of “intelligent” or “cognitive extenders”. In-
deed, systems can vary quite significantly in terms of their
autonomy and degree of coupling with humans. This space
of possibilities merits consideration. In the end, cognitive
extenders could be a standalone paradigm inside AI:
1. because of the tight coupling of cognitive extension, an
accurate modeling of the user is needed to know what the
best way is of compensating or enhancing some skills,
2. with the introduction of new capabilities, the resulting ex-
tended humans can behave in less predictable ways, with
unprecedented cognitive power and personalities,
3. as these cognitive extenders can be poorly designed, can
fail or can change, the implications are more direct in
terms of undesirable effects such as miserliness (cogni-
tive idleness), dependency and atrophy; and
4. due to an integration where humans are able to remain in
control, the responsibility for the AI developer may be di-
luted. If the humans are just seen as extended or enhanced
by the tool, they would plausibly remain responsible.
The impact of cognitive extenders is sufficiently different
from autonomous AI agents that the ethical and social impli-
cations need to be analyzed separately. This paper includes a
series of contributions. We look at AI under the perspective
of extended cognition and place it in a spectrum of present
and future AI systems ranging from autonomous systems
that substitute for human cognition to systems that can help
humans internalize new concepts and ideas. We enumerate a
range of possible cognitive capabilities that can extend hu-
man cognition in the future, and what their impact might
be. From here, we analyze their ethical and societal conse-
quences through the specifics of cognitive extension. Finally,
we address AI researchers and developers, psychologists and
philosophers, regulators and policy-makers with some rec-
ommendations about cognitive extenders, such as how they
should be built in the first place, offered to users, monitored
in a non-intrusive way, and able to be removed (or ‘decou-
pled’) without disabling the user.
Cognitive Extension
Many philosophers now argue that our use of technology
has enabled us to expand beyond our biologically-bound
cognitive capacities, making us smarter and more capa-
ble agents. This is the thesis of extended cognition, pop-
ularized by Clark and Chalmers (1998). The view pushes
back against, and in some cases outright rejects, some of
the core commitments of traditional cognitive science and
the field of AI (Bechtel and Graham 1999; Thagard 1992;
Thagard 1996).
Most importantly, extended cognition theorists univer-
sally reject intracranialism, the view that all cognition is in-
stantiated in the brain. They instead maintain that cognitive
states and processes can be partially constituted by mecha-
nisms beyond one’s brain, that is, the vehicles of our cogni-
tive representations need not be instantiated by sets of neu-
rons in the brain. Their argument is typically motivated by
a version of the computational theory of mind, a core com-
mitment of cognitive science, which (put crudely) maintains
that the mind is the ‘software’ that runs on the ‘hardware’ of
the brain. This view allows for the possibility that the same
mental type could be ‘multiply realized’ or instantiated (just
as a Turing machine could) by heterogeneous physical types
(Putnam 1960; Putnam 1967).
Clark and Chalmers appealed to this view to argue that
cognition can sometimes be partially instantiated by extra-
bodily, non-biological elements, so long as those pieces of
‘hardware’ are able to instantiate the right kinds of compu-
tations. Accordingly, their argument for the extended cogni-
tion thesis has been dubbed the ‘parity argument’, as it relies
on the claim that we should treat computationally equiva-
lent processes with “the parity they deserve”, irrespective of
whether they are internal or external to the skull (Clark and
Chalmers 1998, p.8). They then further argue that, while hu-
man minds might require brains, cognition can be partially
instantiated by external objects, such as our notebooks and
smartphones. It is key that the external resource be appro-
priately integrated; it must be a constant in one’s life, highly
accessible, and reliable (as the brain typically is). It is im-
portant to emphasize the strength of the extended cognition
thesis; it does not merely claim that cognition causally de-
pends on wider processes in the environment, rather it claims
that these wider processes can constitute cognition. Hence,
they can be on a par with the brain.
While the parity argument helped popularize the extended
cognition thesis in contemporary philosophy of cognition, it
is not without limitations. One important consideration for
our discussion is whether cognitive extenders can give hu-
mans novel cognitive capacities or merely be cognitive pros-
thetics. One of the limitations with the parity argument is
the extent to which it relies on an appeal to functional sim-
ilarities between inner and outer resources. In cases where
the outer resource is completely novel and enables cogni-
tive capacities that are beyond anything that could be done
internally (i.e., by the brain), the argument fails. In an at-
tempt to overcome this limitation, as well as others, several
philosophers have argued for the extended cognition view in
distinct ways (e.g., Palermos 2014; Menary 2007; Di Paolo
2009; Sutton 2006; Rowlands 2010).
In what follows, we will adopt the view that cognitive ex-
tenders can not only replace or substitute for functions of the
brain, they can also move beyond the brain to enhance our
biological functions. We will also adopt and adapt some def-
initions in the literature. For instance, the physical objects
that we use to extend our cognition are typically designed
for the purpose of helping us complete some cognitive task.
Hutchins calls these ‘cognitive artifacts’, which he charac-
terizes as “physical objects made by humans for the purpose
of aiding, enhancing, or improving cognition” (Hutchins
1999, p.199). In general, if we include non-artifacts, i.e., nat-
ural objects (e.g., the sun as an orientation extender), we can
use the term ‘cognitive extender’.
The previous definition also blurs the distinction between
enhancement and extension, but we need to make the differ-
ences explicit. For instance, cognitive enhancement through
drugs or other kinds of neural interventions do not count as
cognitive extenders. What is important for cognitive exten-
sion is that the vehicles of our mental representations are
located outside of the head. Whereas nootropics might in-
fluence and enhance brain activity, they do not challenge in-
tracranialism. Similarly, the assimilation of a rule of thumb,
a new word and any other case of learning or psychological
internalization (Vygotsky 1978), enhances cognition, but it
is not an extension. On the other extreme, a complete exter-
nalization (or “cognitive outsourcing”), where the process is
delegated to another person or system in a batched, decou-
pled fashion (e.g., translate a novel between two languages)
does not count as extension either1.
In order to make the notion of cognitive extension more
precise, we slightly refine Hutchins’s definition as follows:
A cognitive extender is an external physical or virtual
element that is coupled to enable, aid, enhance, or im-
prove cognition, such that all – or more than – its posi-
tive effect is lost when the element is not present.
In the definition, it is important to emphasize that the effect
is lost when the element is removed. We thereby understand
terms such as “cognitive atrophy” and “cognitive prosthet-
ics”, emphasizing that the effect ceases when the extender is
removed. In the case of atrophy, more than the given posi-
tive effect is lost. Furthermore, a cognitive extender can be
virtual –this is to include software and augmented reality–
and does not need to be an object in any strict sense.
Let us introduce further terminology and some notation.
The system or humanA that is extended can be referred to as
the extendee, and the result will be denoted by A[E], where
E is the extender. It is only through a very coupled inter-
action between A and E where we can actually talk about
A being extended, and consider E as part of its cognitive
resources. Of course the lines are blurry sometimes, in the
same way extended cognition has been observed in social
contexts with relatives (parent-child), highly interdependent
couples or very close friends, where A (e.g., child) is actu-
ally extended byE (e.g., parent). But note that in the context
of extension we are not interested in the collective capabili-
ties or the social aspect (the collective, denoted by A + E),
but the way A operates as an individual, extended by E, i.e.,
A[E]. Occasionally, we will use the notation A ← E for
A being replaced (or overridden) by E and AE to illustrate
when A has internalized E, so E is no longer necessary.
Note that the definition above is not anthropomorphic. It
could be applied to non-human animals and to AI systems,
1“Cognitive offloading” (Risko and Gilbert 2016) is a related
term usually referring to particular ways of aiding and/or improv-
ing cognition by gestures or manipulation. We will avoid the term
here, as it is not always clear if some examples of cognitive of-
floading are really extenders or are just metacognition strategies,
e.g., tilting one’s head to read a rotated text.
which could be enhanced by other objects, AI systems, and
humans, through ‘human computation’ (von Ahn 2005) or
‘human-extended machine cognition’ (Smart 2018).
AI: Externalize, Internalize or Extend?
AI can be used for cognitive externalization (i.e., outsourc-
ing), for cognitive internalization and for cognitive exten-
sion. Let us examine each case in detail.
The traditional view of AI is typically externalization.
Minsky defined AI as the “science of making machines ca-
pable of performing tasks that would require intelligence if
done by [humans]” (Minsky 1968). An AI system should
solve tasks independently, with limited or no human assis-
tance or manipulation. The term “autonomous agent” was
introduced to represent this goal of AI, and the perspective
from outside the field often reinforces this view, by use of
the related concept of automation. Whenever humans are
still needed it is because AI is not capable enough or be-
cause humans must control or supervise what machines are
doing. Humans and machines can even be synergetic, where
the whole is more than the sum of its parts. However, even in
this A + E situation, AI is not designed to induce a change
in the way the human individual (user) performs cognition.
The narrative of externalization, associated with a view
of replacement A ← E, especially in the workplace, be-
comes more complex as machines are able to do some tasks
better than humans, e.g., memory and calculation. Machines
perform computations faster than humans, deal with larger
amounts of data, and so forth. However, more recently we
see machines doing kinds of cognition that look very differ-
ent from the way humans think, exploiting, e.g., the diver-
gence between biological and artificial neural networks.
On the other hand, internalization in the AI domain im-
plies the acquisition of processes that are observed on a
machine. For instance, a human can see how an AI sys-
tem solves a problem and internalize the procedure. That
does not mean that the machine is necessarily redundant,
but that the human can reproduce (at least approximately)
what the machine is doing. The potential of internalization
with AI, and generative models in machine learning, has re-
cently been explored by Carter and Nielssen (2017): “Rather
than outsourcing cognition, it’s about changing the opera-
tions and representations we use to think; it’s about chang-
ing the substrate of thought itself. And so while cognitive
outsourcing is important, this cognitive transformation view
offers a much more profound model of intelligence aug-
mentation. It’s a view in which computers are a means to
change and expand human thought itself”. Under this view,
AI becomes the creator of new concepts and representations,
which we can then use. AI becomes a teacher or discoverer,
a contributor to the conceptual baggage of human culture.
Internalization seems more empowering than other ways
of augmenting cognition. However, as AI becomes more
powerful, humans may not be able to internalize many of
the concepts created by AI, because of their different capac-
ities and representations, even with huge progress in the area
of explainable AI (Samek, Wiegand, and Mu¨ller 2017).
Finally, cognitive extension, as defined in the previous
section, is not fully externalized, as the tight coupling re-
mains, and not fully internalized, as the cognitive extender is
needed for the functionality. For AI, the design of a system
E to work as A[E] is different from a whole autonomous
system E, but also from A+E or an internalized AE , after
interacting and learning fromE. The flexibility for extension
is much higher, as only the interface needs to be internalized
(e.g., in order to use a calculator, we only need to internalize
the use of the buttons), but many other things do not need to
be understood by the user, in the same way one can drive a
car without knowing all its mechanics. Cognitive extenders
fuelled with AI (henceforth ‘AI extenders’) bridge the area
of human-computer interaction with AI.
This perspective puts the emphasis on an AI that is more
human-centered, but less human-like. If AI systems were
just designed to mimic or replace human behavior or be-
ing internalized by them, the possibilities of cognitive ex-
tension would be limited to cognitive prosthetics, applicable
when the effects of pathologies or aging require to recover
the ‘standard human cognition’.
As an example of how the same functionality can be exter-
nalized, internalized or extended – and the sometimes blurry
lines between them – let us consider translation. A batch
machine translator that takes a text and converts it into an-
other language is an externalized translation service. It is
difficult to go beyond the capabilities that the translator pro-
vides (translation tasks) if just used occasionally and in a
batch mode. A human can look at the result and learn elegant
translation transformations. In this way, the human internal-
izes new methods of translation. However, with a more inter-
active version and a regular use, the translation system starts
being used in a different way (delegating the easy cases, and
reserving those that the person deems more difficult for the
machine). As a result the translation quality of the coupled
system A[E] can increase significantly, as the user can un-
derstand where E fails, or correct some translations that do
not make sense. If a humanA knows a little bit about the lan-
guages to be translated, this assisted translation using E will
become much better than any of A or E could do indepen-
dently. In this latter case, the human is using the extender,
controlling and integrating it for the solution of the task.
Note that the lack of autonomy of E is crucial to see this
as an extension rather than a collaboration. This detachment
between cognition (or even intelligence) and autonomy is
well-aligned with the view of cognition as a service (Spohrer
and Banavar 2015), where several facilities for visual per-
ception, speech and language processing are provided, as
well as other inference and reasoning solutions, independent
of any task. For instance, an online translation system can
be provided as a service, which can be integrated into many
kinds of applications and goals. Whether it is fully external-
ized or seen as an extension will depend on the degree of
coupling, integration, and interaction.
Ways AI Can Extend Cognition
The crucial aspect of AI extenders is that they themselves
implement kinds of cognitive processes; they are not mere
static or interactive tools. This makes cognitive extension
far more powerful and complex than they were when the
extended cognition thesis was introduced – at that time the
standard example was a notebook. Before making an anal-
ysis of the future implications of AI extenders, we need to
have a better understanding of the kinds of extensions that
are envisaged by current and future AI.
Not only must we understand the different areas of cog-
nition, but we have to realise that cognitive extenders are
designed to be tightly coupled. With AI extenders, machine
learning can be used to model human cognition, spot our
cognitive limitations, and exploit our capabilities in full. As
a result, one new trait of the next generation of cognitive
extenders is that they will model the user and change their
behavior by learning from the extendee, thereby allowing
them to personalize the best cognitive aid depending on the
situation. For instance, an AI extender can learn that a per-
son usually utters a particular word or intonation before in-
troducing a compelling argument. The system can suggest
these words when writing or speaking in order to produce
more of these arguments. In the end, future AI extenders can
become cognitive coaches or therapists, if properly devised
to do so. However, for reasons we will discuss in the next
section (e.g. users’ miserliness and companies’ profit), AI
extenders may be designed in such a way that extensions in-
crease faster than the cognitive augmentation can be gained,
such that the user loses control of the symbiotic situation.
In order to see the possibilities of AI extenders, we could
look at recent breakthroughs produced by machine learning
in areas such as voice recognition, emotion understanding,
social interaction, game playing, etc., but that might give us
a shortsighted view of what is coming ahead. A richer ap-
proach can be based on analyzing all areas in which cogni-
tion can be extended. Of course, no standard catalogue of
cognitive abilities exists, but the hierarchical theories of in-
telligence in psychology, animal cognition and the textbooks
in AI usually agree (at least partially) on the following abil-
ities, or at least, in this way of organizing the vast space
of cognition. For our purposes, we integrate from several
sources2 and analyze AI extenders under these categories:
• Memory processes: cognitive extension happens when
writing is introduced, and our memories (individually and
collectively) were enhanced. In the future, we will surely
see more of the Google effect (Sparrow, Liu, and Wegner
2011) and cognitive assistants reminding us of an event
or appointment. But AI extenders can also introduce new
customized mnemonics to improve long-term memory,
or tag our experiences with related people, concepts and
other situations to improve episodic memory.
• Sensorimotor interaction: AI extenders can perceive, rec-
ognize and manipulate patterns in different ways, not
only through new sensory and actuator modalities but in
terms of mixing representations through generative mod-
els (Carter and Nielsen 2017). This means that new sen-
sors can be intelligently translated into ways that are prop-
2We take a mixture from figures 3.1 and 3.2 (human psychomet-
rics, from Thurstone’s primary mental abilities and Cattell-Horn-
Carroll hierarchical model), table 4.1 (animal cognition research,
from Wasserman and Zentall’s book) and tables 5.2, 5.3 and figure
5.3 (AI, AGI and benchmarks, from AI Journal and Adams et al.),
all sources found in (Herna´ndez-Orallo 2017).
erly understood by our senses, and new actuators can be
integrated as interactive possibilities.
• Visual processing: many of the most striking new applica-
tions of machine learning have been around ways in which
images and videos can be processed and generated. Cou-
pled with augmented reality and other ways of transform-
ing the input through intelligent filters, the possibilities
of seeing things we cannot usually see –and in different
ways– are endless.
• Auditory processing: this includes systems that highlight
those parts of the speech that might be missed by the user,
following different conversations and prompting the user
when an interesting topic is raised by any of them. AI
extenders can do this in more powerful (and less stressful)
ways than we are used to.
• Attention and search: examples such as “the invisible Go-
rilla” (Chabris and Simons 2010) show how easily hu-
mans overlook things. This can be seen as a feature rather
than a bug, but success is sometimes only known in hind-
sight. If an AI extender models our interests or goals,
however, it can search through information or focus our
attention on things that we would otherwise overlook.
• Planning, decision-making and acting: agendas and other
daily tasks will be planned by our cognitive assistants,
rather than just being passive systems where we write
things up that are reminded later. This will entail better
use of our time, including what times of the day we are
ready for different kinds of cognitive tasks.
• Comprehension and expression: AI extenders will help
us with understanding information. This will go beyond
floating annotations, including rewriting or re-rendering
to improve interpretability. This can also be applied to
reading, watching films, listening music, other arts, etc.
• Communication: AI systems could reply to our emails and
write our tweets, but they could also be used in more ex-
ecutive ways, such as telling an assistant to communicate
X to Y (e.g., that Y is fired) in the best possible way.
• Emotion and self-control: with AI becoming better than
humans at what is called ‘emotional intelligence’, we
could have systems that will inform us of our emotions
and those of others, detect when emotions are fake and
help us trigger the right emotional reactions.
• Navigation: this goes much beyond the use of GPS de-
vices, to include the association of places and routes with
cognitive processes, including memories, people, images,
etc., with a new sense of location and time, related to the
new kinds of episodic memory mentioned above.
• Conceptualization, learning and abstraction: machine
learning and knowledge representation can find categories
that humans could have never found. These abstractions
can be inferred from data or knowledge and explained to
us so that we operationalize (but not fully internalize) the
new concept as part of our reasoning processes.
• Quantitative and logical reasoning: there is already much
potential in ways uncertainty can be processed by cog-
nitive extenders in terms of probabilities and frequen-
cies. For instance, many systems monitoring us can report
probabilities of events (e.g., risk of accidents) or quanti-
ties (people in a room) in real time.
• Mind modeling and social interaction: AI extenders can
model the extendee’s network of contacts, and anticipate
decisions, actions and interests of other people. In the end,
they can report the BDI (beliefs, desires and intentions) of
others (enhancing social capabilities).
• Metacognition: the metacognition of A evolves into the
metacognition of A[E]. AI extenders can identify the po-
tential and limitations of E, who will be more aware of
them, using the capabilities and strategies of both A and
E more optimally.
The previous characterization in terms of breadth (range of
abilities that can be extended) and depth (how the exten-
der adapts to and intervenes on the user) gives us a more
grounded position to understand the impact of AI extenders.
Implications
The list in the previous section looks highly empowering,
giving a generally positive view that is shared with some
other takes on human augmentation (Bostrom and Sand-
berg 2009). Other sources, however, focus directly on the
negative effects (Carr 2015; Frischmann and Selinger 2018;
Danaher 2018; Carter and Palermos 2019). Some of these
concerns extend over the range between externalized and in-
ternalized processes, but do not properly situate the analysis
under the extended mind thesis (Vold 2018). For instance,
Danaher (2018) revisits the issue of social interaction as de-
ceptive if done by AI tools, but this is seen differently if we
consider that the ‘persona’ is actually the whole A[E] and
not an “outsourced” E “on A’s behalf”. Surveying previous
work from a full extended mind perspective, we classify the
ethical issues into five groups:
• Atrophy and safety: The first main issue about exten-
sion that differs from augmentation through externaliza-
tion or internalization –but is shared with augmentation
through drugs (nootropics)– is that all –or more than– its
positive effect is lost when the element is not present, as
for our definition of cognitive extender. There seems to
be nothing wrong about making humans’ life easier, but
taking into account the miserliness of human cognition
(Fiske and Taylor 1984), as AI provides more cognitive
possibilities, the risk of humans being dumbed down in-
creases (Carr’s “degeneration” effect, 2015). Recent re-
search (Barr et al. 2015) shows that individuals have dif-
ferent predispositions to cognitive miserliness and dele-
gation on devices such as smartphones. Cognitive atrophy
also generates many safety issues, as people may become
vulnerable when the extender is removed (or if it suddenly
fails to work). It is not E, A[E], A ← E, AE or A + E
that become unsafe, but A[∅].
• Moral status and personal identity: cognitive extension is
particularly sensitive since the “degree of dependency and
integration [is] proportional to the artifact’s moral status”
(Heersmink 2017). This means that regulation should go
beyond ownership and compensation for damage (Carter
and Palermos 2019): our extended minds should not be
interfered with without permission, or removed if the user
can no longer afford it. Similarly, privacy should reach all
the elements that play a role in an extended mind, includ-
ing intellectual property, as whatever A[E] creates should
be owned by A and not shared, as in an A + E situation.
Frischmann and Selinger (2018), for example, warn that
we should be concerned about external parties coming to
own E, and what is created by E, rather than A.
• Responsibility and trust: it is not always clear who is re-
sponsible when autonomous AI systems fail or behave in
an unfair way, but AI extenders can well take the perspec-
tive of software licenses, where the manufacturer usually
puts responsibility on the user, with trust being compro-
mised. If this is the case, companies will even be encour-
aged to use extended humans A[E] when autonomous
systems on their own (E) are forbidden (e.g., for some
jobs) or a human-in-the-loop is needed to supervise or
correct E. For instance, who is responsible when a doctor
extended by a diagnosis system makes a mistake com-
pared to a fully automated diagnostic system?
• Interference and control: many of the issues about the im-
pact of AI on independence and manipulation (Danaher
2018) become more complex when AI is tightly coupled
through cognitive extension. The main problem will come
with extenders that model and monitor human behavior
to find the targeted interventions that optimize some met-
ric of cognitive enhancement, and can degenerate into so-
phisticated ways of surveillance and manipulation, well
beyond the relatively decoupled smartphones and ‘nudg-
ing’ personal assistants of today.
• Education and assessment: as AI extenders become more
powerful and integrated, it will be more difficult (perhaps
even unethical) to remove them whenever humans are in
education or evaluation contexts. Should college exams
be performed with (A[E]) or without (A[∅]) the cognitive
extenders? A job interview? Should cognitive evaluation,
including IQ tests, be modified or compared to the situa-
tions with and without the cognitive extenders?
All the specifics above suggest that many issues about the
impact of AI must be reconsidered in the particular con-
text of AI extenders, including reliability, moral status, value
alignment, evaluation, regulation, manipulation and other
cultural, political and social impacts.
Recommendations
Our general recommendation is that AI extenders must be
seen distinctively from other cognitive extenders not using
AI and especially from AI systems that are externalized, au-
tonomous, or decoupled. This is the case inasmuch as the
questions about the impact of AI extenders become much
more subtle and specific than in the other cases.
For instance, do we need to understand what an AI sys-
tem does? Most technological tools and processes that be-
come strongly integrated with human cognition (e.g., writ-
ing, driving, typing, etc.) are not “explained” to humans.
There is no need to explain how a pen works, or a key-
board, in order to have a smooth integration between the hu-
man and the tool. The role of human-computer interfaces is
not explaining how the subsystem works, but creating a re-
liable interface such that some cognitive processes are cre-
ated and internalized to take the most of the tool (Newell
and Card 1985; Bonnardel and Zenasni 2010; Jacko 2012;
Carter and Nielsen 2017).
There are some more specific recommendations that we
can direct to AI developers in particular. First, and most
importantly, AI developers should take care to distinguish
when they are developing an autonomous system, a de-
coupled system or a system that is meant to be fully cou-
pled. They can inherit the experience of user interfaces and
human-computer interaction, such as how the experience of
the user will be affected, how comfortable it will be or what
the secondary effects are for humans (Rogers, Sharp, and
Preece 2011). This means that these systems require not only
AI prowess but a strong expertise in human cognition, espe-
cially at the level of capabilities and personality traits.
Second, there are lessons for philosophers of mind and
psychologists under the view of AI extending human cogni-
tion. How do we ensure that these possibilities improve the
mind? How do we measure whether they are really ‘exten-
sions’ and not simply tools? How do we analyze the differ-
ences in adaptation before, during and after the cognitive ex-
tenders are used? What kinds of innate general abilities, cog-
nitive styles or personalities make extension more powerful?
Theories of development may be revised, as some sequences
of cognitive extensions may be more effective, beneficial or
risky than others. As cognitive extenders are going to mod-
ify humans at a profound psychological level, it is important
to determine what kinds of interventions and intrusions are
potentially dangerous or unethical.
Third, while the notions of autonomy and agency are cru-
cial, regulators and policy-makers should be careful about
only regulating autonomous systems (e.g., a ban on au-
tonomous weapons) as this still leaves humans vulnerable
to being used to circumvent these regulations, creating ex-
tended ‘zombies’, a new way of “undermining responsibil-
ity” (Cave et al. 2018). Certifications should be given not
only after analyzing when the cognitive extender is operat-
ing (for a diversity of human users) but most especially when
the cognitive extender changes or ceases to operate.
In general, AI is going to present a diverse range of op-
tions for achieving some functionalities, with different de-
grees of coupling. Given the future potential of going be-
yond human capabilities, a relevant part of AI must focus on
cognitive extenders. These AI extenders must be designed
taking full awareness of the capabilities and autonomy of
the extended human jointly with some objective function of
what the resulting symbiosis will be able to do, and all the
implications of that coupling.
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